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Freedom of Expression, Discrimination, and the
Internet: Legislative Responses and Judicial
Reactions
Talia Joundi*
INTRODUCTION
The spread of hate speech in Canada is an urgent issue in need of greater
societal attention. Hate speech causes harm to individuals and groups and
increases animosity between people in a society. Racist expression constitutes
hate speech because it necessarily targets an individual or group based on their
identification with a racial, ethnic, or religious background; in Canada, the law
prohibits discrimination on these grounds. In this article, I focus on racist speech
in particular, the premise being that racism—whether communicated offline or
online—divides and deeply harms society.
Racist speech is by its very nature degrading and of low value.1 Moreover, it
tends to target the most vulnerable segments of the population. Therefore, the
medium used to communicate racist expression does not always mitigate the
potential harm caused to the victim. Cyber racism refers to the ways in which the
Internet and digital media have opened new avenues for expressions of racism
across boundaries. While people use the Internet to learn, communicate, and
explore, the Internet can also be used to target, threaten, or insult people based
on race.
The presence of cyber racism critically informs how people understand
themselves, society, and issues of race and social justice. Cyber racism also
informs the ideas and perspectives adopted by young people, and has a direct
impact on their learning. If the proliferation of cyber racism is not taken
seriously, it will continue to have long-lasting and detrimental impacts on
society. I emphasize that a critical and honest discussion of the sources and
harmful consequences of, and the appropriate responses to, online racism is
needed sooner, rather than later. While appropriate responses may involve courtenforced remedies or legislative reform, complex problems call for
comprehensive solutions, which extend beyond the reach of the law. At the
political level for example, any vigorous defence of free speech must acknowledge
that hate speech continues to cause deep harm to racialized individuals and
communities in Canada. In other words, if the defence of freedom implies a
defence of the right to engage in racist speech at the expense of racial minorities,

*
1

B.C.L./LL.B. McGill 2015, currently student-at-law.
R. v. Keegstra, 1990 CarswellAlta 192, 1990 CarswellAlta 661, EYB 1990-66942, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131 (S.C.C.) [Keegstra cited to S.C.R.].
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then serious consideration must be given to whether freedom is truly the endgoal.
In Part I of this article, I argue that cyber racism is inextricably linked with
systemic discrimination. The definition of systemic discrimination relied on was
first provided by Judge Abella in the Report of the Royal Commission on Equality
in Employment (Abella Report), which states that systemic discrimination points
to practices or attitudes that can result in inequality of opportunity for
individuals or groups.2 The Supreme Court of Canada has since adopted this
definition, and in some instances, has acknowledged that systemic problems
require systemic remedies. The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate how
situating cyber racism within the context of systemic discrimination illuminates
the sources of the problem, the appropriate responses, and the multiple
stakeholders who have a role to play in curbing cyber racism.3
Following the contextualization of the problem, Part II will discuss cyber
racism alongside the phenomenon of the Internet more specifically. In this part, I
argue that cyber racism is not a new problem, but simply a new form of a wellknown social ill. While the nature and location of racist speech may have
changed due to advancements in digital media and the omnipresence of
technology, the forces that work to perpetuate racist or discriminatory acts
remain deeply embedded in society. For this reason, we must avoid demonizing
the Internet, and direct our energy towards users of the Internet instead.
Part III of this article will provide an overview of the legal framework related
to racist speech in Canada, including human rights legislation and free speech
jurisprudence. Here, I will introduce the relatively recent legislative change to the
Canadian Human Rights Act (the CHRA), i.e. the repeal of section 13. I use the
discourse and debates surrounding the repeal of section 13 of the CHRA to
highlight the tension between freedom of expression interests and the need to
protect vulnerable groups from hate speech. Secondly, Part III will introduce
constitutional conflicts raising section 2(b) claims in order to demonstrate how
Canadian courts have responded to this tension.
I will explore five cases dealing with freedom of expression, beginning with
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor,4 which provided a definition of
hate speech in 1990 that was adopted in later decisions. Next I will discuss R. v.
2

3

4

Report of the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, by Rosalie Silberman Abella
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1984) at 2 [Abella Report].
See, e.g., the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyberbullying, appointed by the
province in May 2011 to look at the issue of bullying and cyberbullying in Nova Scotia.
The Task Force was made up of various stakeholders in recognition that ‘‘[t]he struggle
against bullying must be waged on many different fronts”: A. Wayne MacKay,
Respectful and Responsible Relationships: There’s No App for That: The Report of the
Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and Cyberbullying. Submitted to the Nova Scotia
Department of Education on February 29th, 2012. Available on request from the
Department of Education and electronically published at <http://antibullying.novascotia.ca/taskforce> at 8.
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, 1990 CarswellNat 742, 1990 Carswell-
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Keegstra which, though it was a case in the criminal context, is a key decision
because the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed that hate speech is by its very
nature degrading, of low value, and does not advance any of the goals of freedom
of expression. This discussion is followed by an analysis of Citron v. Zündel,5
where the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal dealt with online communications.
Lastly, two recent decisions, Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal6
and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Warman 7 reaffirm the
constitutionality of section 13 of the CHRA. Specifically, in Whatcott, the
Court emphasized that because hate speech has a ‘‘tendency to silence the voice
of its target group,” it can ‘‘distort or limit the robust and free exchange of
ideas,”8 and is therefore detrimental to the very values forming the basis of our
fundamental freedoms. To conclude this section, I will discuss the serious
implications of repealing section 13. Because the government has prioritized
individual freedoms over robust collective protections, it has created a legislative
void in relation to discrimination claims.
In Part IV, I propose a specific constitutional amendment. While I appreciate
the slow pace of legal reform, I posit that it is imperative that Canada creates
progressive laws that can better protect society from discriminatory speech. To
this end, the Canadian government and ultimately Parliament can gain
inspiration from other jurisdictions. This discussion is followed by a broader
theoretical analysis of the framework within which claims of human rights
violations are assessed. I argue that the adversarial structure relied on by courts
and human rights tribunals is an inappropriate method to adjudicate claims of
discrimination. While structural reform of adjudicative bodies is beyond the
scope of this article, Part IV invites readers to reflect on whether the adversarial
framework can effectively protect victims of discrimination.
Finally, the article will conclude with a focus on legal and policy
recommendations. Part V will return to the discussion of systemic problems
and systemic remedies introduced in Part I. In this section, I gain inspiration
from pedagogical experts who explain that online manifestations of racism can
be directly connected to how young people learn and interact in the school
environment. The institutional culture of schools can inadvertently serve to
perpetuate prejudices and stereotypes; this institutional culture includes the

5

6

7

8

Nat 1030, EYB 1990-67250, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129 (S.C.C.) [Taylor
cited to S.C.R.].
Citron v. Zündel, 2002 CarswellNat 4364, 41 C.H.R.R. D/274 (Can. Human Rights
Trib.) [Zündel cited to Carswell].
Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, 2013 SCC 11, 2013 CarswellSask 73,
2013 CarswellSask 74 (S.C.C.), reconsideration / rehearing refused 2013 CarswellSask
236, 2013 CarswellSask 237 (S.C.C.) [Whatcott].
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Warman, 2012 CF 1162, 2012 FC 1162, 2012
CarswellNat 3691, 2012 CarswellNat 3692 (F.C.), affirmed 2014 CarswellNat 127, 2014
CarswellNat 5431 (F.C.A.) [Warman F.C.].
Ibid at para 114.
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school’s values, norms, assumptions, and habits. For this reason, educators,
administrators, and policy-makers must look beyond curricula when confronting
racism in schools. I explore the incorporation of a literacy program which
includes teaching both legal literacy and digital media literacy, and which has the
goal of empowering young people to navigate the Internet in a safe and positive
way.

I. DEFINING THE CONTEXT: SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION
Contextualizing the spread of hate speech involves confronting the systemic
nature of discrimination. Systemic discrimination continues to pervade Canadian
institutions, operating to systematically keep certain groups in society more
vulnerable than others. Although the discrimination experienced by a distinct
group may take different forms, understanding the nature of systemic
discrimination with respect to one group is an invaluable aid to understanding
systemic discrimination with respect to other groups.
Parliament established the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment
(chaired by Judge Rosalie Abella) in 1983 to address changing patterns of
Canadian society as women and minorities began making up larger segments of
the labour force. As a result, the Report of the Commission on Equality in
Employment, also known as the Abella Report, was released in 1984.9 The Abella
Report recognized that women, native people, disabled persons, and visible
minorities were not being granted equal job opportunities. It defined systemic
discrimination as: ‘‘practices or attitudes that have, whether by design or impact,
the effect of limiting an individual’s or a group’s right to the opportunities
generally available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics.” 10
Canadian courts subsequently adopted this definition of systemic discrimination.
The Abella Report also clarified that such discrimination does not require proof
of intent to harm in order to attract judicial scrutiny:
It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an
intentional desire to obstruct someone’s potential, or whether it is the
accidental by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If
the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative
way, it is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may
be discriminatory.11

Significantly, the Abella Report recognized that systemic discrimination in
the workplace required a systemic response. It led to the enactment of the
Employment Equity Act in 1986. The Employment Equity Act sought to ensure
9

10
11

Equity and Diversity Directorate, History of Employment Equity in the Public Service and
the Public Service Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Public Service Commission of
Canada, 2011), online: <www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/plcy-pltq/eead-eeed/rprt/ee-psc-cfp/pdf/
ee-psc-cfp-eng.pdf >.
Abella Report, supra note 2 at 2.
Ibid.
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that no one would be denied employment opportunities and benefits for reasons
unrelated to ability, and to eliminate systemic barriers faced by designated
groups.12
Canadian human rights commissions have championed much of the research
and advocacy related to systemic discrimination, since higher courts often do not
hear such cases. The research published by human rights commissions is
important because their reports frame discrimination as plaguing an entire
system rather than individuals alone, and connect individual grievances with
institutional inequalities. The Canadian Human Rights Commission’s (CHRC)
‘‘Report on Plans and Priorities” for the 2013-2014 fiscal year identifies systemic
discrimination as a first priority; in answering why this is, the Commission states:
Systemic discrimination is the creation, perpetuation or reinforcement
of inequality among disadvantaged groups. It is usually the result of
seemingly neutral legislation, policies, procedures, practices or organizational structures. The effect creates barriers to full participation in
society. These include barriers to employment, benefits, services and the
physical environment.13

In the same vein, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (Ontario HRC)
defines systemic discrimination as ‘‘patterns of behaviour, policies or practices
that are part of the structures of an organization, and which create or perpetuate
disadvantage for racialized persons.”14 In the Quebec context, the issue has been
discussed by the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse
(Quebec Commission). The Quebec Commission is specifically mandated to
ensure that Quebec’s laws, bylaws, standards, and institutional practices comply
with the Charter, which prohibits discrimination based on race, colour, ethnic or
national origin, and religion in the exercise of human rights and freedoms. 15 To
achieve this mandate, the Quebec Commission conducted a public consultation
on systemic discrimination and racial profiling, which targeted three sectors: the
public security sector; the education sector; and the youth protection system. The
consultation affirmed the prevalence of systemic discrimination in Quebec’s
institutions, and the urgent need ‘‘to stimulate a discussion of potential solutions,
12

13

14

15

Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44. See also the Equity and Diversity Directorate,
supra note 9; See also University of British Columbia, ‘‘Employment Equity”
(Vancouver: UBC), online: <equity.ubc.ca/employment/>.
Canadian Human Rights Commission, ‘‘Report on Plans and Priorities, 2013-14”
(Ottawa: CHRC) at 4, online: <www.chrc-ccdp.ca/sites/default/files/rpp-eng.pdf>.
See also Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, Racial
Profiling and Systemic Discrimination of Racialized Youth: Report of the Consultation on
Racial Profiling and its Consequences (CDPDJ, 2011) [CDPDJ Report].
Ontario Human Rights Commission, ‘‘Racism and Racial Discrimination: Systemic
Discrimination (Fact Sheet)” (Toronto: OHRC) at para 2, online: OHRC <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/racism-and-racial-discrimination-systemic-discrimination-fact-sheet>
[OHRC, ‘‘Systemic Discrimination”].
CDPDJ Report, supra note 13.
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and to create a broader understanding of the consequences of this type of
discrimination for Quebec society.”16 Aside from legal or administrative bodies,
issues-based organizations have also played a major role in advancing the
recognition of the proliferation of systemic racism in society. Moreover, these
organizations strive to keep adjudicative bodies accountable for their
commitment to combating systemic racism and intersectional discrimination
through research and advocacy.17
The notion of systemic discrimination gained wide legal recognition in
Canada in the case Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Human Rights
Commission), which dealt with an issue that arose in the context of
employment.18 Though the decision related to the workplace, the ruling set an
important precedent for future cases involving systemic discrimination against
historically disadvantaged groups in Canada. Action Travail des Femmes, a
Montreal-based community group, complained to the Canadian Human Rights
Commission that the practices and procedures for hiring and promoting
employees adopted by the Canadian National Railway (CN) denied
opportunities to women, and were therefore discriminatory. The Tribunal
found that the evidence clearly indicated discriminatory practices, concluding
that it was necessary to impose upon CN a special employment program. 19 On
appeal, The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the Tribunal has the power,
under section 41(2)(a) to impose upon an employer an employment program that
responds to systemic discrimination in the hiring and promotion of a
disadvantaged group (referring, in this case, to women).20 In doing so, the
Supreme Court returned to the analysis of systemic discrimination provided by
the Abella Report, concluding that discrimination can result from the simple
operation of established procedures of recruitment, hiring, and promotion, which
are not necessarily designed to promote discrimination.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that to combat systemic discrimination
‘‘it is essential to create a climate in which both negative practices and negative
attitudes can be challenged and discouraged.”21 The Court’s pronouncement on
16

17

18

19
20

Ibid at 10, 14. Based on their findings, the report defined systemic discrimination
as:Systemic discrimination involves both direct and indirect discrimination, but is also
goes much further. It is based on the dynamic interaction between decisions and attitudes
tainted by prejudice, and on organizational models and institutional practices that have
harmful effects, whether intended or not, on groups that are protected by the Charter.
See, e.g., the Center for Research-Action on Race Relations (CRARR), a Montrealbased independent, non-profit civil rights organization founded in 1983 to promote
racial equality and combat racism in Canada: Center for Research-Action on Race
Relations, ‘‘Our Mandate and Services” (Montreal: CRARR), online: <www.crarr.org/
?q=node/1>.
Canadian National Railway v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 1987 CarswellNat
831, 1987 CarswellNat 905, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, [1987] S.C.J. No. 42 (S.C.C.) [CN v.
CHRC cited to S.C.R.].
Ibid.
Ibid at 1124.
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how to respond to situations of inequality of opportunity is a crucial aspect of
the judgment’s legacy; specifically, the Court noted that ‘‘[s]ystemic remedies
must be built upon the experience of the past so as to prevent discrimination in
the future.”22

(a) Systemic Remedies for Systemic Problems: Are We There Yet?
Though references have been made to the need for court-enforced systemic
remedies, their likelihood and viability remain in question. 23 In British Columbia
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U. 24 the Court
found that the aerobic standards forming part of a mandatory fitness test of
forest firefighters discriminated against women. The issue arose because Tawney
Meiorin, a female forest firefighter, had lost her employment after failing the
mandatory test. In this case, an individual’s grievance exposed standards of
systemic exclusion embedded in a ‘‘neutral” employment standard. This case
confirmed that direct and indirect or adverse effect discrimination require the
same analysis in order to ensure that hidden or institutionalized forms of
discrimination are exposed and remedied. As stated by Colleen Sheppard, legal
scholar in the field of constitutional law and equality rights, naming adverse
effect discrimination ‘‘reinforces the importance of redressing systemic
inequalities that result in exclusion and prejudice through institutional
transformation and not merely by individual special treatment.” 25 Indeed, the
discrimination claim put forward by Meiorin advanced the human rights analysis
by forcing the Court to consider the complexities of the manifestations of
systemic discrimination. And yet, legal experts have questioned whether this
analysis has facilitated the framing and enforcing of systemic remedies.
How have the courts responded to the broad and systemic nature of many
discriminatory practices? According to Dianne Pothier, the Supreme Court of
Canada’s performance in relation to properly framing and enforcing systemic
remedies has been less than impressive. Pothier looks critically at the Supreme
Court’s approach in Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), noting
that although the issues at hand warranted systemic remedies, the Court reverted
to ordering individual remedies, diverging from its own long-standing
jurisprudence. Pothier writes that the institutional capacity of human rights
21
22
23

24

25

Ibid at 1139.
Ibid at 1145.
Dianne Pothier, ‘‘Adjudicating Systemic Equality Issues: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Action Travail des Femmes” (2014) 18:1 C.L.E.L.J. 177 [Pothier, ‘‘Systemic Equality”].
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.E.U. , 1999
CarswellBC 1907, 1999 CarswellBC 1908, (sub nom. British Columbia (Public Service
Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU) [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46
(S.C.C.) [Meiorin cited to S.C.R.].
Colleen Sheppard, ‘‘Of Forest Fires and Systemic Discrimination: A Review of British
Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.” (2001) 46:2
McGill L.J. 533 at 558.
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adjudication has been seriously challenged since the Canadian National Railway
v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) decision was decided nearly three
decades ago.26
In Moore S.C.C., the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the systemic
remedy awarded by the Tribunal on the basis of remoteness.27 Jeffrey Moore
initiated a complaint against the North Vancouver School Board and the
Province of British Columbia on the basis that he had been discriminated against
because of serious learning disabilities (SLDs). Because the school district did not
provide options to meet the educational needs of students with serious learning
disabilities, Moore had to attend a private school for students with learning
disabilities from kindergarten to graduation—the year the BC Human Rights
Tribunal issued its decision.
The Tribunal found that the school district and the ministry of education
discriminated against students with SLDs based on their failure to provide
reasonable accommodation, and their inability to prove undue hardship.28 The
Tribunal provided for individual remedies in the form of damages, and in
addition, awarded systemic remedies, which included an order against the
ministry to make funding available for students with learning disabilities. On
judicial review, the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided
that there was no discrimination, and therefore the question of systemic remedies
was ousted from the conversation. The Moores were granted leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
The question of how and when to grant systemic remedies landed in the
hands of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court broadly defined the relevant
services under the human rights code29 and confirmed the Tribunal’s key finding
of systemic discrimination. The Tribunal had defined the goal of a systemic
analysis as being:
[T]o review all of the evidence about the education system to examine
the way in which it operates, as a system. . ..If that evidence discloses
that there are systemic barriers, through Ministry policies or actions,
that do not facilitate access, then a finding of systemic discrimination
should follow.30
26

27

28
29

According to Pothier, the 1987 Action Travail des Femmes (referred to in this paper as CN
v. CHRC) decision represents ‘‘a high-water mark in the invocation of systemic remedies
in human rights cases” and that the promise that systemic remedies could be relied upon
has not been fulfilled: Pothier, ‘‘Systemic Equality,” supra note 23 at 208.
Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2012 SCC 61, 2012 CarswellBC
3446, 2012 CarswellBC 3447 (S.C.C.) [Moore S.C.C.].
Ibid at para 46.
Justice Abella defined special education as being the means by which those students get
meaningful access to the general education services (ibid at para 5). According to
MacKay, ‘‘[b]roadly defining the services covered by human rights codes also promotes a
broad and purposive interpretation of equality”: A. Wayne MacKay, ‘‘The Marriage of
Human Rights Codes and Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: A Case for
Greater Separation in Both Theory and Practice” (2013) 64 U.N.B.L.J. 54 at 80.
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An expansive definition of services under the BC Human Rights Code did not
translate into a broad award of systemic remedies against the provincial
department of education. Rather, the Court put the responsibility on the school
board. The Court’s reason for disagreeing with the Tribunal’s award of systemic
remedies was that the ‘‘remedy must flow from the claim.” 31 In the case before it,
the claim had been made on behalf of the individual complainant, around whom
the evidence was centred; systemic remedies were rejected on this basis.
The suggestion that systemic remedies can be rejected based on the individual
nature of the complaint does not align with the broad remedial authority
articulated in Meiorin. Pothier recognizes that although the issue in Moore
S.C.C. was much more complex than that in Meiorin (involving the design and
operation of the whole public school system rather than a single exclusionary
standard),32 she criticizes the way the Court averted the issue of when and how
systemic remedies can be granted. This, she believes, undermines the principle
that incidents of discrimination can (and should) point to the need for systemic
responses.
It is important to take a step back, and note the reality that Canadian human
rights tribunals remain the primary adjudicators for individual complaints
stemming from systemic issues. In a recent judgment, the Quebec Human Rights
Tribunal specified that: ‘‘one of the characteristics of systemic discrimination is
the disproportionate exclusionary effect, which, for the members of a group
contemplated by a prohibited ground of discrimination, stems from a set of
practices, policies and attitudes.”33 Therefore, advancing complaints related to
systemic discrimination remains challenging due to serious evidential barriers
and burdens on the plaintiff at the start. Recently, a decision by the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal stated that evidence of such claims often relies on ‘‘‘the
subtle scent of discrimination.’”34 While the detrimental impact on the person
bringing a well-founded complaint to the Tribunal is anything but ‘‘subtle,” the
covert nature of discrimination requires courts to rely on inferences. As noted by
an Ontario Commission race policy dialogue paper, ‘‘ [w]hile cases of overt racial
harassment usually turn on the credibility of the parties and their witnesses, cases
alleging more subtle forms of racism are, not surprisingly, contingent on
30

31
32
33

34

Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2005 BCHRT 580, 2005 CarswellBC
3573 (B.C. Human Rights Trib.), reversed 2008 BCSC 264, 2008 CarswellBC 388 (B.C.
S.C.), affirmed 2010 BCCA 478, 2010 CarswellBC 3446 (B.C. C.A.), reversed 2012
CarswellBC 3446, 2012 CarswellBC 3447 (S.C.C.) at para. 840, supra note 27.
Moore S.C.C., supra note 27 at para 64.
Pothier, ‘‘Systemic Equality,” supra note 23 at 202.
Québec (Commission des droits de la personne des droits de la jeunesse) c. Gaz
Me´tropolitain inc., 2008 QCTDP 24, 2008 CarswellQue 15059, 2008 CarswellQue 8515
(T.D.P.Q.) at para. 28, varied 2011 CarswellQue 6683, 2011 CarswellQue 15856 (C.A.
Que.).
Turner v. Canada Border Services Agency, 2014 CHRT 10, 2014 CarswellNat 560 (Can.
Human Rights Trib.) at paras. 28ff.
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inferring discrimination through circumstantial evidence.” 35 In addition, the
Public Service Alliance of Canada opined that ‘‘[i]t can be difficult to establish
that people are excluded from employment opportunities due to the taint of
stereotyping or unwillingness to judge people on the basis of merit.” 36
Despite the fact that changes have been incremental and inconsistent at
times, political and legal actors have recognized that systemic discrimination is
not an abstract notion but, rather, a concrete and pervasive problem. Court
decisions that acknowledge systemic discrimination can play a role in compelling
anti-racism efforts. The simple recognition that seemingly neutral legislation or
standards can have extremely harmful effects on vulnerable populations is an
important reminder for legislators and policy-makers who seek to create broader
human rights protections for people across Canada. Moreover, decisions
involving the interaction between human rights Codes and the Charter
demonstrate the transformative potential of human rights legislation.
Overall, decisions taken by administrative tribunals, regulatory bodies, and
statutory human rights agencies reinforce the fact that in order to deal with
manifestations of discrimination and racism there is work to be done below the
surface. As pointed out by the Ontario Commission, ‘‘tackling systemic
discrimination can be complex.”37 To conclude, I argue that Canadian courts
should follow the lead set by human rights commissions and civil rights
organizations in identifying systemic discrimination as a priority, which involves
a commitment to racial equality and social justice. This commitment should
translate into a willingness to consider the viability of systemic remedies.
While the law plays a critical role by setting precedents reflecting how society
must govern itself, the law is not the whole answer. In order to properly
understand the pervasive problem of hate speech in Canada and across
boundaries, the issue must be framed within the context of systemic
discrimination. Ultimately, systemic discrimination continuously manifests
itself in new forms, such as cyber racism. This article will demonstrate that
cyber racism is a systemic problem that calls for vigorous solutions involving
multiple stakeholders. It is imperative that the issue be addressed from both
inside and outside of the legal context.

II. RACISM AND THE INTERNET: AN OLD PROBLEM, A NEW
DIMENSION
In this section I argue that while the nature and location of racist speech may
have changed, the forces that work to perpetuate racist and discriminatory
35

36

37

Ontario Human Rights Commission, ‘‘Surveying Racial Discrimination Cases,” by
Amyn Hadibhai (OHRC, 2004), online: OHRC <www.ohrc.on.ca/en>.
Public Service Alliance of Canada, ‘‘Human rights victory: Member wins discrimination
case and sets precedent for other workers,” (PSAC, 2014), online: <psacunion.ca/
human-rights-tribunal-agrees-cbsa-discriminated-against-job-applicant>.
OHRC, ‘‘Systemic Discrimination,” supra note 14.
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actions are deeply embedded in society. For this reason, I emphasize the need to
avoid making the Internet the focus when shaping appropriate responses to the
problem of cyber racism.
The Internet is ubiquitous and powerful in terms of its ability to influence
public opinion. ‘‘Cyber hate” has been identified on the international level as a
danger in need of an active response. In June 2009, the United Nations held a
seminar entitled ‘‘Cyber Hate: The Dangers of Cyber Space” as part of an
‘‘Unlearning Intolerance” series. In his concluding remarks on the seminar, Ban
Ki-moon stated that though the Internet is a positive force, and has transformed
the way people live and work, ‘‘[f]or young people, electronic harassment and
cyber hate can have a searing impact. . .we have seen it time and again targeting
innocents because of their faith, their race, their ethnicity, their sexual
orientation.”39
I mention such initiatives because they are part of the way forward; however,
I reject the position that the Internet is the source of the problem. As reinforced
by the discussion of systemic discrimination, racism exists in structures and
policies—the dissemination of ideas based on hatred and racial superiority were
an urgent social problem before the emergence of digital communications and
media. Technological innovations have simply changed how the message is
communicated, which does not diminish its effect. In other words, racist
messages communicated via websites, social media, or Internet message boards
can be just as harmful to anyone subject to them as those communicated offline.
Though her analysis focuses on the rise of white supremacy online, Jessie
Daniels’ description of the manifestation of racial hatred on the Internet is
informative. In her book, she notes that digital media is neither a ‘‘raceless
panacea,”40 nor a dangerous place where people are lured into hate groups;
rather, the Internet provides a new method to spread old forms of hatred:
Old forms of overt white supremacy (e.g., racist hate speech) have
moved into the Information Age alongside new, emergent forms of
white supremacy that include searchable databases of (racially identifiable) user names easily exported for use in mass e-mails along with new
forms of covert white supremacy at cloaked sites, whose goal is to
undermine the very idea of racial equality.41

Regardless of how it is named—electronic harassment, cyberhate, or cyber
racism—the issue poses new challenges and opportunities for parents, educators,
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Ban Ki-moon, ‘‘Secretary-General’s Remarks at Seminar on Cyber Hate: Danger In
Cyber Space” (Address delivered at the Seminar on Cyber Hate, New York, 16 June
2009) [unpublished], online: <www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=3927>.
Jessie Daniels, Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil
Rights (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) at 188. Daniels is a professor in
sociology and is recognized as a national expert on white racism in the United States.
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legislators, scholars, and community workers in understanding the meaning of
racial hatred, anti-racism, and social justice.

III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: CANADIAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
The discourse surrounding free speech in Canada reveals the tension between
two interests: a) the fundamental freedom of expression enjoyed by individuals;
and b) the protection from discrimination on certain prohibited grounds
afforded to minorities. Though these two interests are not necessarily
antithetical, the individualist crusade has so obscured the discourse that it has
made it seem that they are necessarily so. In this section I provide an overview of
the legal framework related to racist speech in Canada, which includes human
rights legislation and free speech jurisprudence. The discussion will include the
repeal of section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, and the implications of
the repeal on discrimination-based claims. I argue that the repeal increases the
potential for the spread of hate speech, and stands in opposition to the values
underlying a just and democratic society.
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it ‘‘subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.”42 Section 2 of the Charter states that ‘‘[e]veryone has the following
fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
media of communication.”43 Furthermore, the Charter explicitly condemns
racial discrimination pursuant to section 15(1), which states:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.44

In addition, The Canadian Human Rights Act45 (CHRA) and provincial
human rights codes prohibit discrimination based on race.
The Criminal Code protects people from acts of hate and hate propaganda.
In the criminal context, racial hatred as a harmful form of expression must meet
the definition of ‘‘hate speech” in order to attract a criminal law response. While
hate speech does not have an internationally agreed upon definition, Canadian
courts understand it as speech that can incite violence or prejudiced actions
42

43
44
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
Ibid, s. 2.
Ibid, s. 15.
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [CHRA].
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against particular groups of people. Two sections of the Criminal Code are
relevant to hate speech—sections 318 and 319.46 Under section 319, ‘‘‘statements’
includes words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electromagnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs or other visible
representations.”47 Section 318 recognizes that advocating or promoting
genocide also constitutes an indictable offence.48 Moreover, section 318(4)
defines ‘‘identifiable group” as ‘‘any section of the public distinguished by
colour, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, or
mental or physical disability.”49
In sum, while hate speech can potentially attract criminal sanctions it has
historically been under the purview of both criminal and human rights law. In the
context of online expression, protection from electronic harassment was
provided for by remedial human rights legislation. Canadians who felt
discriminated against by material published online had recourse to a human
rights remedy under section 13 of the CHRA, which provided that it is a
‘‘discriminatory practice” to send hate messages via telecommunications
equipment, including the Internet. Section 13 of the CHRA allowed the
Canadian Human Rights Commission to hold hearings and give penalties to
individuals and groups who communicate hate messages by telephone or the
Internet.50 I write in the past tense because this section of the CHRA no longer
exists. In June 2012, the House of Commons voted to repeal section 13(1). On
June 26, 2013, the provision was formally repealed pursuant to Bill C-304 (also
known as An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (protecting
freedom)).51
46
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Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 318-319.une 26, to tts bited grounds note 53 at 9.
Employmente Repeal. Section 319 defines ‘‘[p]ublic incitement of hatred” as an
indictable offence: (1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place,
incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a
breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
There are some defences against criminal charges under these sections: see ibid, s. 319(3).
Ibid, s. 319(7).
Ibid, s. 318 [emphasis added] reads:(1) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years. . .(2) In this section, ‘‘genocide” means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable group, namely, (a) killing members of
the group; or (b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction.
Ibid, s. 318(4).
CHRA, supra note 45, s. 13(1) provided that:It is a discriminatory practice for a person or
a group of persons acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so
communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a
telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any
matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the
fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground
of discrimination.
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(a) Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act: The Debate, the
Discourse, and the Repeal
The ability to fight for a more racially just society is predicated on the
ability to name and confront the continued presence of racial injustice
through public speech acts that bring attention to these issues. To
suggest that the call for a limit to racially harassing language is an
attempt to curtail freedom of speech is to grant legitimacy to a
deliberate mischaracterization of the issue.52

The political discourse surrounding the repeal of section 13 reveals that those
who identify as ‘‘free speech advocates” consider the repeal to be a major
democratic achievement. The debates leading up to the repeal aptly illustrate the
tension between an individual’s free speech interests, and the broader protection
of human rights in Canadian law. Alberta Conservative MP Brian
Storseth—who initiated the Bill that repealed section 13—is quoted describing
the provision as a ‘‘flawed piece of legislation,” and referring to the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal as ‘‘a quasi-judicial, secretive body that takes away your
natural rights as a Canadian.”53 Supporters of his arguments included selfidentified free speech advocates, who characterized section 13 as a ‘‘sword
against Canadians.”54 In other words, critics of section 13 succeeded in
antagonizing the provision by characterizing the law as an ‘‘anti-free speech”
provision, thus securing its repeal.
Notwithstanding, critics of Parliament’s decision predicted a flood of online
hate. According to the University of Calgary’s Darren Lund, whose research
centres on human rights and diversity issues, this repeal ‘‘leaves a huge gap. . .
There are so many hate sites right now on the Internet, and I think some
reasonable monitoring of the hatred they’re spewing fits with the Canadian ethos
of living harmoniously in a democracy.”55
Similarly, I argue that by repealing section 13 of the CHRA the government
has effectively decided that: a) promoting equality, diversity, and pluralism; and
b) protecting individual and group dignity, are less important objectives than
51
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Bill C-304, An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (protecting freedom), 1st
Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (assented to 26 June 2013), S.C. 2013, c. 37.
Brittney Cooper, “Stop mocking ‘safe spaces’: What the Mizzou & Yale backlash is
really about” Salon Magazine (18 November 2015), online: <http://www.salon.com/
2015/11/18/what_the_mizzou_yale_backlash_is_really_about_the_right_of_white_people_to_engage_in_racial_recklessness/>. In her article, Professor Cooper articulates why dismissing the importance of safe spaces for people of colour on U.S. college
campuses ignores the harm caused by racially charged verbal harassment.
Michael Woods, ‘‘Hate speech no longer part of Canada’s Human Rights Act,” National
Post (27 June 2013), online: <www.nationalpost.com>.
Ibid.
Charlie Gillis, ‘‘Section 13: How the battle for free speech was won: Five years, two
tribunals, secret hearings, a court challenge and a turning point,” Maclean’s (19 June
2012), online: <www.macleans.ca>.
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protecting an individual’s free speech rights. Victims of racial hatred or other
discriminatory speech are denied a viable mechanism through which they can
advance their complaints. Indeed, human rights lawyers, the Canadian Bar
Association, and Canadian jurisprudence have expressed the value of section 13
as a citizens’ tool to protect themselves against hate speech. While recognizing
that section 13 of the CHRA did not function perfectly, it nevertheless played an
important role in responding to the needs of vulnerable individuals and
communities, as will be discussed in the following sections.

(b) An Overview of Freedom of Expression Jurisprudence
While those who attacked section 13 did so on the basis that it had a
significant censoring effect on individual speech, this assertion is not supported
by Canadian freedom of expression jurisprudence. On the contrary, Canadian
courts have affirmed the constitutionality of section 13, stating that while it limits
the freedom of expression guaranteed in section 2(b) of the Charter, it constitutes
a reasonable limit due to the pressing and substantial objective of ensuring
people are not subject to hate propaganda.56 The judicial trajectory serves to
reaffirm that the repeal of section 13 comes to the detriment of those most
vulnerable to being subject to racist speech. Other decisions have demonstrated
the court’s willingness to curb not only freedom of expression, but also freedom
of the press and the open courts principle in the name of protecting the privacy
rights of a victim seeking redress.57
The expansion of the digital world brought with it a wave of complex
constitutional conflicts.58 A series of cases dealing with freedom of expression
will be explored in this section, beginning with Canada (Human Rights
Commission) v. Taylor and R. v. Keegstra, which provided authoritative
definitions of hate speech. Next, I will discuss the issue of online
communications raised in Citron v. Zündel. Two recent decisions, Whatcott v.
Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal and Canada (Human Rights Commission)
v. Warman, reaffirmed the constitutionality of section 13 of the CHRA.
In Taylor, a white supremacist challenged the ability of section 13(1) of the
CHRA to silence his speech. The claimant was operating a hate promotion
telephone service at the time the case was brought to the court. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that controlling hate speech was within the purview of
human rights legislation, ruling that though section 13 does violate section 2(b)
of the Charter, it is saved by section 1 as a reasonable limit in a free and
56
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Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, ‘‘Annual Report, 2002” (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services, 2003) at 10, online: CHRT <chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/ns/pdf/annual02e.pdf> [CHRT, ‘‘2002 Report”].
A.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, 2012
CarswellNS 675, 2012 CarswellNS 676 (S.C.C.) [A.B. v. Bragg].
A. Wayne MacKay, ‘‘Law as an Ally or Enemy in the War on Cyberbullying: Exploring
the Contested Terrain of Privacy and Other Legal Concepts in the Age of Technology
and Social Media” (2015) 66 U.N.B.L.J. 3 at 41 [MacKay, ‘‘Ally or Enemy”].
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democratic society.59 The Supreme Court concluded in Taylor that hate
propaganda presents a serious threat to society and that in seeking to prevent
the harms caused by hate propaganda, the objective behind section 13(1) is
obviously one of pressing and substantial importance sufficient to warrant some
limitation upon the freedom of expression.60 The Court determined that hate
propaganda contributes little to the aspirations enshrined in section 2(b) of the
Charter such as the quest for truth, the protection of democracy, or individual
fulfillment. Furthermore, the Court recognized that the values of equality and
multiculturalism found in sections 15 and 27 of the Charter ‘‘magnify the
weightiness of Parliament’s objective in enacting s. 13(1).”61 In other words,
respect for the dignity and equality of the individual as a member of a particular
group can justify the infringement on the freedom of expression.
Another seminal case in the free speech trajectory is Keegstra, which
examined the constitutionality of the limitation on free speech included in the
Criminal Code. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Dickson rejected the
respondent’s argument that there could be no rational connection because it was
questionable whether section 13 actually mitigates the spread of hateful speech. 62
According to the Chief Justice, the very process of hearing a complaint and, if
substantiated, issuing a cease and desist order, ‘‘reminds Canadians of our
fundamental commitment to equality of opportunity and the eradication of
racial and religious intolerance.”63 Moreover, the Chief Justice argued that
paradoxically, hate speech undermines the very principles upon which freedom of
expression is based and contributes little to the ‘‘quest for truth, the promotion of
individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant
democracy where the participation of all individuals is accepted and
encouraged.”64 Finally, the Court concluded that the important parliamentary
objective reflected in the enactment of section 13(1) is an objective supported by
research, as well as by ‘‘our collective historical knowledge of the potentially
catastrophic effects of the promotion of hatred.”65
The most prominent Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision on the issue
of hateful expression over the Internet, Zündel, dealt with a website maintained
by Ernst Zündel, a free speech activist who had been charged for spreading antiSemitic literature. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court of Canada,
59
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Taylor, supra note 4 at para 77.
Parliamentary Information and Research Service, ‘‘Canadian Anti-hate Laws and
Freedom of Expression (Background Paper)” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2010),
online: <www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/2010-31-e.pdf> [‘‘Walker
Paper”].
Taylor, supra note 4 at 920 .
Keegstra, supra note 1.
Taylor, supra note 4 at 924.
Keegstra, supra note 1 at 766.
Ibid at 758.
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and resulted in the striking down of the provision in the Criminal Code that
prohibited publication of false information on the basis that it violated the
freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.66 However, because Mr.
Zündel tried to strike down the constitutionality of section 13 of the CHRA in his
arguments, the decision also dealt with free speech in the context of remedial
human rights legislation.
The Tribunal found that while Mr. Zündel was not the owner of the website,
he exercised a significant amount of control over what was posted on it. Mr.
Zündel and those acting in concert with him were ordered to stop communicating
the material that formed the subject of the proceedings. 67 The Tribunal noted
that the Supreme Court of Canada had upheld section 13 in previous decisions as
a justifiable infringement on freedom of expression, and that while the provision
may limit freedom of conscience and religion, it does so to protect the dignity of
others.68 The Tribunal found the respondent’s evidence of section 13’s supposed
‘‘chilling effect” on freedom of expression to be unconvincing. The Tribunal also
concluded that the provision was not so vague as to violate the principles of
fundamental justice.69 The decision is notable not only because it affirmed that
section 13 is constitutional, but also because it held that the CHRA applies to
Internet communications. The government respected the Court’s direction and
amended the provision to include Internet communications. 70 Subsequent
Internet hate promotion decisions made by the CHRT followed the precedent
set by Zündel, recognizing that section 13 can be used to limit free speech for the
greater purpose of protecting individuals and communities from being subject to
hate speech—whether communicated online or offline.71
In Warman F.C., the Federal Court of Canada reviewed a decision taken by
the CHRT in 2009, which dealt specifically with the introduction of a penalty
provision to section 13 subsequent to Taylor, and thus changed the nature of the
constitutional analysis.72 The Tribunal held in that case that section 13, when
viewed in conjunction with the types of remedial orders that can be imposed in
relation to that section under section 54 of the CHRA, is an unreasonable
infringement of section 2(b) of the Charter. The CHRT concluded that the
introduction of these provisions meant section 13 became ‘‘more penal in nature”
which could result in a chilling effect on free speech. However, the Tribunal
refrained from making declarations on the constitutionality of section 13. 73 The
Federal Court, receiving the decision on judicial review, confirmed that the
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
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penalty provisions were of no force or effect. This case is significant because the
Federal Court found that the Tribunal should have applied section 13 and in
doing so, affirmed the provision’s constitutionality.74
Decisions justifying the infringement of free expression on the basis of
respect for the dignity and equality of individuals or particular groups have yet to
be contested. On the contrary, in 2013 the Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott
upheld anti-hate laws as a reasonable limit on free expression. The Court
conducted a full review of hate speech laws, and the appropriate tests to conduct
to justify the courts’ limitation of free speech. The Court ruled that the benefits
of section 13 outweighed any impact it has on freedom of expression. The Court
in Whatcott referred to Taylor, which set the parameters for what constitutes
hate speech:
[C]ourts...[using] Taylor[’s] definition of hatred. . .have generally
identified only extreme and egregious examples of delegitimizing
expression as hate speech. This approach excludes merely offensive or
hurtful expression from the ambit of the provision and respects the
legislature’s choice of a prohibition predicated on ‘hatred.’75

Whatcott reiterated and clarified this definition of hate speech, declaring that
only the most egregious expressions could justifiably limit freedom of expression. 76
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, provided a useful discussion of
hate speech that is worth repeating. In attempting to define the term, she states it
is an effort to marginalize individuals based on their membership in a group.
Furthermore, hate speech seeks to ‘‘delegitimize group members in the eyes of
the majority” reducing their acceptance within society:
Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing emotional distress to
individual group members. It can have a societal impact. . ..Hate speech
lays the groundwork for later, broad attacks on vulnerable groups. . .
[that] can range from discrimination, to ostracism, segregation,
deportation, violence and, in the most extreme cases, to genocide. . .
.It [also] impacts on [a protected] group’s ability to respond to the
substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier to
their full participation in our democracy.77

Whatcott reinforces that section 13 and similar legislation (in this case,
section 14(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, which is similar to section
13 of the CHRA because it prohibits ‘‘any representation. . .that exposes or tends
to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any
person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground”78) are vital to the
74
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protection of individual and group dignity in a pluralistic society. Furthermore,
the decision makes it clear that such legislation does not significantly impact the
rights to freedom of expression, but rather, provides that only speech of an
‘‘ardent and extreme nature” should be considered to meet the definition of
‘‘hatred.”79 This definition of hatred is important in order to avoid far-reaching
liability, and to ensure that complaints do not have unintended adverse effects on
vulnerable minorities.80 Therefore, restrictive provisions found in a remedial
human rights legislative context rather than as part of the criminal law do not
adversely affect the constitutional acceptability of the provision.

(c) A Canada without Section 13: A Critical Analysis of the Repeal
Since the repeal of section 13(1) of the CHRA, human rights law no longer
plays a role in protecting people from online harassment, including cyber racism.
The Criminal Code acts as the sole source of protection against hatred
disseminated via electronic means, placing online hate speech under the
exclusive domain of the criminal justice system. This has serious implications
in light of the fact that in the criminal context, standards of proof are much
higher, and convictions are rarer. In order to lay a charge, evidence must show
that the material in question was wilfully promoted, that it targeted an
identifiable group, and that it meets the common-law test of hate material (all
beyond a reasonable doubt).
The decisions taken by the court on the issue of freedom of expression in
discrimination claims reveal that characterizing anti-hate legislation as
unjustifiable censorship of free speech obscures urgent issues that human
rights legislation seeks to respond to. Using the free speech argument to
undermine the value of remedial human rights legislation blatantly disregards the
fact that hate speech is endured on a daily basis by vulnerable populations, and
that the Internet is simply another forum through which racist speech is spread.
78
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Ibid at para 12 [emphasis removed].
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organizers of political campaigns, LGBT groups for anti-religious speech, or even
language-rights activists. Creating parameters for what constitutes hate speech is vital to
protection from discrimination. In August 2015, Quebec proposed Bill 59, which seeks to
ban hate speech and speech inciting violence. A general assessment by CRARR noted
that the Bill requires significant amendments to avoid creating injustices in the pursuit of
justice and protection from discrimination. The first key amendment proposed by
CRARR is for ‘‘hate speech” and ‘‘speech inciting violence” to be defined in accordance
with Whatcott, without depriving victims who experience the personal effects of hate
speech of the right to file complaints and claim damages for themselves. According to
CRARR, failure to define ‘‘hate speech” and ‘‘speech inciting violence” opens the door
to potential abuse of the Bill: Center for Research-Action on Race Relations, News
Release, ‘‘Quebec’s Hate Speech Bill has Serious Flaws, Many Provisions Possibly
Unconstitutional,” (28 August 2015), online: CRARR <www.crarr.org/?q=node/
19722>.

210 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[13 C.J.L.T.]

Overlooking the seriousness of these issues is based on a false premise that
racism is part of Canada’s past, not its present. This notion is illustrated in media
commentary which seeks to minimize or deny existence of present day racism; for
example:
Canada’s human-rights law is a product of the 1960s, when much of
our society truly was shot through with bigotry and prejudice. Those
days are gone, thankfully, and laws such as the Canadian Human
Rights Act now comprise a greater threat to our liberty than the harms
they were meant to address.81

A critical analysis of the repeal must involve an analysis not only of public
opinion, but also of the legal arguments advanced in support of the repeal. Some
legal arguments see criminal standards as more suitable for the regulation of hate
speech. Richard Moon submitted a report to the Canadian Human Rights
Commission in 2008 concerning section 13 of the CHRA and the regulation of
hate speech on the Internet. The report provided a useful framing of the broader
debate surrounding freedom of expression, and simultaneously supported the
repeal of section 13. Moon argued that section 13 should be removed from the
CHRA and that hateful expression be regulated under the Criminal Code.
In response, I point out that the ‘‘potential drawbacks to an exclusive
reliance on the Criminal Code hate speech provisions” that Moon mentioned
warrant more attention than he gave them. Moon mentions in passing multiple
drawbacks, including: ‘‘the higher burden of proof [on claimants], the
requirement that the Attorney General of the particular province consent to
prosecution and the lack of experience on the part of police and prosecutors in
pursuing hate speech cases.”82 These drawbacks are not insignificant. While any
citizen can file a human rights complaint, the high burden of proof and the
required approval of the Attorney General limits the protection allegedly offered
by the Criminal Code to disadvantaged groups in society. As the Ontario Human
Rights Commission noted, this does not accord with other areas of human rights:
‘‘[f]or example, when sexual harassment involves allegations of violence or
assault, it too becomes a mat[t]er for the Criminal Code, but still remains under
the purview of human rights legislation.”83
In his book, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression, Moon
explores the value of expressive freedom, and comments on the limited reach of
81
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rights adjudication in this context.84 Moon recognizes the pervasive nature of
discriminatory speech, only to the extent that it supports his argument that rights
adjudication is an inappropriate mechanism for addressing racist expression. 85
He argues that enforcing limits on speech risks undermining a constitutional
freedom while failing to address the true causes of the harm. In other words, the
pervasive nature of racist speech calls for the elimination of stereotypes and a
shift in popular culture rather than decisions challenging the Constitution’s
commitment to free expression.86 While Moon may be right on the scale of the
problem, this approach could be problematic because it focuses on securing a
free public discourse, the value of which is framed as being greater than other
values entrenched in the Constitution such as equality, respect, and individual
dignity. Moreover, he states that, ‘‘[a]ny attempt to exclude all racial or other
prejudice from public discourse would require extraordinary intervention by the
state.”87 While Moon identifies problems with interfering with freedom’s
demands in a framework of rights review, he fails to provide tangible
alternatives for securing not only free discourse, but also discourse based on
fundamental principles of equality.
The belief that hate speech does not belong within the framework of human
rights review and can be adequately responded to by Parliament wielding the
criminal law power is misplaced. What is required instead is a discussion of how
to change the structures and practices that may encourage or facilitate these acts.
Focusing resources on targeting and punishing individual perpetrators ultimately
shields the state from accountability. In light of the discussion of systemic
discrimination, it is clear that the state plays an active role in condoning
discriminatory practices, and thus, has a responsibility to exclude prejudice from
public discourse. In other words, the state has a responsibility to honestly and
critically confront the institutions, policies, and programs that perpetuate racial
bias, whether overtly or covertly. Taking responsibility does not amount to
‘‘extraordinary intervention”88 but constitutes recognition that racism remains a
pervasive problem within Canadian institutions and society.
The impetus behind a reliance on the criminal justice system to counter
racism reflects the significant shift in the political climate in Canada. Less than
ten years ago, the federal government advocated for a ‘‘coordinated approach”
to combating hate and racism. A report published by the department of
84
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Canadian Heritage entitled A Canada for All: Canada’s Action Plan against
Racism represented ‘‘the first-ever horizontal, coordinated approach across the
federal government to combat racism.”89 The plan—spear-headed by Prime
Minister Paul Martin, and never actually put into action—identified six key
priorities to guide governmental activities, two of them being: ‘‘[e]ducate children
and youth on diversity and anti-racism,” and ‘‘[c]ounter hate and bias.” 90
Moreover, the report recognized that while Canada has put forward various
initiatives to promote equality and combat discrimination, ‘‘it will require more
than legislation to close gaps in social and economic outcomes.” 91 The
government recognized the need to involve a variety of stakeholders, including
‘‘children, young women and men in its anti-racism strategy,” and maintained
that the action plan could promote a lifelong educational approach to antiracism.92 Indeed, this approach stands in stark contrast to existing solutions that
rely on criminal sanctions to address the spread of racism.
An exclusive reliance on the criminal justice system creates a legislative gap
in relation to prohibited grounds of discrimination. Institutional and procedural
barriers will likely make it nearly impossible to lay criminal charges for hate
speech on the Internet. Criminalizing hate speech is not the most appropriate or
sustainable way of dealing with cyber racism. As recognized by the Ontario
Commission;
Human rights codes and consequently commissions and tribunals
should have a role in matters of hate expression. Recognizing the harm
of hate speech through a finding of discrimination has important social
value and potential for other forms of response even if censorship is
accepted as an exceptionally narrow legal remedy.93

A sincere confrontation of the issue must involve a more robust remedial
human rights framework to address systemic racism and discrimination.
A discussion of the privacy rights implicit in sections 7 and 8 of the Charter is
essential to a comprehensive discussion of freedom of expression in the
cyberbullying context.94 However, this discussion will not be elaborated upon
here except in the context of potential remedies. At issue in A.B. v. Bragg was the
amount of anonymity a victim can claim in judicial processes. 95 The case
involved allegations of online bullying and defamation on Facebook. In a
precedent-setting decision, the Supreme Court recognized the severity of the
89
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problem of cyberbullying in Canada, and sided with the plaintiff, a young
female. The Court allowed her to pursue the identity of her cyber bully for a
defamation claim anonymously. In this particular decision, the privacy rights of
a victim seeking redress weighed more heavily than the freedom of the press and
the open courts principle.96 A discussion of the role the right to privacy should
take in constructing remedies for victims of online hate speech is outside the
scope of this article; however, A.B. v. Bragg demonstrates that
victims—including young people, women, and other marginalized
victims—may very well have privacy rights in seeking access to legal remedies. 97

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL REFORM
It is incumbent upon us to reject [...] facile conversations about freedom
and do the hard work of figuring out how we can secure a robust
democracy with lively public discourse without endangering and
harming students of color on predominantly white campuses [...] But
to do so, we would have to acknowledge that words and language have
power.98

The fundamental freedom of expression entrenched in the Charter is, like all
other rights and freedoms, subject to reasonable limits prescribed by law in
accordance with section 1 of the Charter. Freedom of expression decisions must
grapple with the question of what constitutes ‘‘a reasonable limit” on freedom of
expression. Freedom of expression jurisprudence has attempted to carve out the
scope of section 2(b) by defining the meaning of the term ‘‘expression.” However,
other than the section 1 limitation, there are no explicit exceptions to freedom of
expression. Drawing inspiration from the South African Constitution, the
following proposal for legal reform involves the inclusion of an internal
limitation operating independently of section 1 of the Charter.
Section 2(b) of the Charter could include an internal limitation that would
introduce exceptions to the right of freedom of expression from which there
could be no derogation—meaning the courts would have to interpret these
exceptions strictly. For example, section 16(2) of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996 contains the following limitations to freedom of expression:
‘‘[t]he right in subsection (1) does not extend to a. propaganda for war; b.
incitement of imminent violence; or c. advocacy of hatred that is based on race,
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.” 99
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The effect of the internal limitation on law making and policy is that
governments could enact anti-discrimination laws within the class of speech
listed in the limitation. In Canadian law, such hate speech legislation or
regulation would not be subject to the general limitation analysis conducted
under section 1. As explained by Christa van Wyk of the Department of
Jurisprudence of the University of South Africa in reference to the limitation of
free speech in the South African Constitution: ‘‘[i]n short, a statute prohibiting
hate speech as defined in the Constitution cannot be subject to a freedom of
expression challenge, because there is not constitutional right to speech of this
nature.”100
While anti-hate speech provisions have not been invalidated in all provincial
human rights codes, they continue to be challenged in court on the basis that they
violate freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.101As previously
mentioned, while the law is not the whole answer to the spread of online racism,
it does play a critical role. In Keegstra, Chief Justice Dickson explains that
Parliament’s preference to regulate hate speech through legislation rather than to
trust it to the hands of the marketplace, though not the most effective way of
addressing discriminatory ideas, is reasonable: ‘‘the state should not be the sole
arbiter of truth, but neither should we overplay the view that rationality will
overcome all falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of ideas.” 102
I recognize that the issue of enforcing anti-discrimination laws is a
particularly complex one; nevertheless, the onerous process of advancing a
human rights complaint should give us pause. The following section briefly
reflects on the limits of the adversarial structure in the context of discriminationbased claims.

(a) A Preliminary Critique of the Adversarial Structure
Despite disagreeing with Moon’s approach to confronting hate speech,
aspects of his analysis are valuable. I agree with Moon’s effort to problematize
remedial human rights legislation based on the fact that it requires private
citizens to take law enforcement into their own hands. The complaints procedure
places a significant and, arguably, an unreasonable burden on victims of
discrimination bringing forward the complaint. It is the victim that is responsible
for advancing the complaint through both the investigation and adjudication
stages and while the Canadian Human Rights Commission is imbued with
legislative authority to initiate claims, historically, this has rarely occurred. 103
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Hate speech necessarily targets a group, even when directed at a particular
individual. Often a targeted person is simply being used as a scapegoat for a
claim about a larger group. Seen in this light, the burden is on the individual
complainant to bring forward a complaint in order to rectify harms caused to
groups and communities. Moon notes that without the initiative of individuals,
‘‘section 13 might have no operation at all.”104 Aside from the significant time
and money required from complainants, Moon points out that due to the
irrational behaviour of many of the respondents in such cases, complainants can
be subject to threats of violence, noting that some complainants have been
subject to death threats. Moon quotes Andrea Slane, who describes the burden
on the victim as the ‘‘high degree of personal commitment” required from an
individual to see a complaint through to its conclusion. Therefore, those few
individuals who have actually filed section 13 complaints and followed through
with the process ‘‘can be considered activists in the area of online hate.” 105
The complaint procedure, which exists within an adversarial structure, may
therefore be an inappropriate framework to respond to claims of systemic
discrimination. The spread of racism involves public and private interactions,
which are not simply bilateral transactions between individuals but have wide
social implications. The plaintiff often embodies the victim, the spokesperson,
and the beneficiary in one person. Transforming the adjudicative structure of
human rights tribunals could involve a tribunal where the victim is not an
individual, but a group of which the spokesperson is not necessarily a member.
This could provide a remedy by which all members of a particular group benefit
from the institution of prohibitions on racial harassment, even though not
everyone has individually suffered from the harassment. 106 Such a structure
would also cause the wrongdoer to disappear, and focus instead on the bodies or
stakeholders capable of achieving reform in the area.107
In sum, due to the significant drawbacks of confronting hate speech within
the confines of the criminal justice system, it is in the public’s interest that
incidents of hateful expression remain under the purview of both human rights
law and criminal law. Remedial human rights legislation can offer broad public
interest remedies beyond those available under criminal law. Meanwhile, it is
worth reflecting on how the complaints process through the CHRC could be
reformed so that public wrongs such as hate speech are not left to individuals to
rectify. Structural changes to the adjudication system could place greater
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responsibility on government bodies and powerful stakeholders to enforce the
law rather than on private citizens.

V. TACKLING THE PROBLEM: THE LIMITS OF THE LAW
Whatever our profession—minister, civil servant, administrator, professor, building superintendent, publisher—each of us has an important
role to play in the fight against racism and racial discrimination.”
—Esmeralda Thornhill

108

Due to the ubiquitous nature of the Internet and the ability to disseminate
expressions instantaneously, widely, and anonymously, cyber racism may appear
uncontainable. Nevertheless, the persistent nature of the problem demands
efforts to conceive of comprehensive and creative responses which extend beyond
the reach of the law.109
Firstly, condemning cyber racism should not be equated with a
condemnation of the Internet or digital media, one obvious reason being that
the Internet is not going anywhere anytime soon. As stated by Professor
MacKay: ‘‘[f]or many young people, being connected to the online world is as
important as breathing—or at least a close second.”110 Moreover, as noted by
researchers in the field, the participatory quality of digital media means that
though the Internet is an inherent part of the problem, it nevertheless remains an
important part of the solution. In forming ways to address cyber racism,
stakeholders must appreciate that technology is an important tool for social
change. Digital media can spark innovation, open people’s minds to new ideas
and possibilities, and allow for greater citizen participation in social issues.
People use the Internet to explore, to create, and to dissent. Young people are
using technology to stand up for themselves, and for each other—technology can
give them agency and allow them to contribute to their social futures.111
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Secondly, I follow the lead of experts in the field who have emphasized the
importance of preventative rather than punitive measures in the education,
policy, and legal sphere.112 This principle was recognized on the international
level during the World Summit on the Information Society. The summit
produced the ‘‘Geneva Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action,” which
called for preventative measures to tackle abuse of information and
communication technologies for acts motivated by racism, xenophobia, and
related intolerance.113 Another initiative, the Child Online Protection launched
by the International Telecommunications Union in collaboration with other UN
agencies, has similar goals.114 UNICEF has also begun several initiatives to help
teach children, parents, and teachers how to better protect themselves against
online abuse.115
According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, these initiatives had the
goal of empowering children and young people through education and
awareness, providing advice and safety tips for parents and educators, and
offering information for policy-makers and industry to formulate national and
international strategies.116 The discussion of how to achieve these goals is an
urgent one. Significantly, Ki-moon identifies various stakeholders, and states
that parents, the Internet industry, and policy-makers have a responsibility to
teach children how to protect themselves, to curb the proliferation of hate
speech, and to re-examine the balance of human rights and basic freedoms in the
context of cyber hate.117 As noted by Dr. MacKay, ‘‘[t]here is no doubt that legal
responses must be paired with educational initiatives, prevention strategies and
attitude changing communications, at all levels.”118
Finally, while the Internet industry certainly plays a role in allowing greater
protection in certain situations, website administrators are not the source of the
problem. Internet filters or protection measures, therefore, are usually only
useful for addressing overt forms of cyber racism. Energy directed towards
combating Internet industries would be better directed towards the users of these
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technologies, i.e., towards encouraging the critical thinking skills needed to
develop digital media literacy, an approach I explore in the following section.

(a) The School: An Arena for the Exchange of Ideas
[D]espite our good intentions the terms with which we describe the
problems of racial discrimination embody the same discriminatory
concepts and values, and legitimize the very injustices and inequalities
that they are trying to eradicate. Our terminological tools need
therefore to be re-evaluated and corrected.”
—Esmerelda Thornhill

119

While it may be argued that school curricula are no longer overtly racist due
to the advent of Canadian multicultural policies, this does not mean that the
institutional culture of schools does not remain problematic, for ‘‘[t]he school is a
microcosm of society, and a racist society will exhibit power struggles in
school.”120 As Ghosh notes: ‘‘the problem of Eurocentric educational systems
across Canada does produce racist effects, largely through textbooks’ nonrecognition and mis-recognition of the contribution of groups of people.” 121
Indeed, the systemic nature of the problem makes it clear that simply changing
school curricula is not the answer; rather, the very discourse around race needs to
be changed. Ghosh describes the target as being the ‘‘hidden curriculum,” which
refers to the socialization process in schooling—a curriculum that is taught
without being formally ascribed. It emanates from the social, political, and
cultural environments of the society and must be understood in relation to the
overall societal power structures that influence the education system. 122
Likewise, Canadian human rights commissions have recognized that racism
can be embedded in school policies—just as it is in certain legislation. In
discussing the education sector, the Quebec Commission Report states that the
discrimination factors that help to explain the educational problems of racialized
students cannot be reduced to merely a series of individual decisions. Therefore,
while discrimination of students can be partly based on individual decisions
affected by prejudice, such discrimination emanates from organizational models
or institutional structures that, though facially neutral, are not adapted to the
needs of certain groups or are clearly harmful to them.123
Though some school board policies recognize race as a basis of
discrimination, most subsume discussions of racial harassment under the
umbrella of ‘‘bullying” which can serve to bypass the discussion of race.
Changing the discourse around race is one part of changing the practices that
119
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perpetuate racism in schools. It is the role of educational administrators at both
the provincial and national level to devise strategies and policies addressing not
only school curricula, but also the very conversation being had. However, the
following discussion will not focus on teaching race literacy, but rather, will
emphasize the role of legal literacy and digital media literacy in empowering
young people. The educational approach proposed involves a multiple-literacies
program.124

(b) Confronting Racism: The Multiple Literacies Approach
Bullying is a major social issue throughout the world and is one of the
symptoms of a deeper problem in our society: the deterioration of
respectful and responsible human relations. The magnitude of the
problem is daunting and there are no simple solutions on the horizon.
There are, however, some effective strategies.”
—A. Wayne Mackay125

Canadian courts have articulated that beyond legislative reform,
institutions—especially schools—can play a critical role in shifting societal
views. In Attis v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, the Supreme Court of
Canada stated the following, worth repeating in full:
A school is a communication centre for a whole range of values and
aspirations of a society. In large part, it defines the values that
transcend society through the educational medium. The school is an
arena for the exchange of ideas and must, therefore, be premised upon
principles of tolerance and impartiality so that all persons within the
school environment feel equally free to participate.126

In the context of racial and religious discrimination, Chief Justice Dickson
has stated that: ‘‘discriminatory ideas can best be met with information and
education programmes extolling the merits of tolerance and cooperation between
racial and religious groups.”127 I use this statement to support the argument that
schools must incorporate discussions on race and equality in the context of
lessons on digital media and online communication.
There is no doubt that Canadian youth do not wait for a visit to the library
to find answers to their questions—there are ways around that online. It follows
that when researching issues related to race, national, or ethnic origins, or
religion, ‘‘the Internet is often the first, and sometimes only, source that young
124
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people consult.”128 The presence of racism online critically informs the ideas and
perspectives adopted by young people, and directly affects their learning. As
Daniels articulated in her writing on cyber racism, ‘‘[w]hether it is youth of color
exploring the history and political struggles of their own racial and ethnic
heritage [or] white youth attempting to understand diverse ‘others,’” search
engines are often the first and only information destinations for young
researchers.129
Schools, therefore, are starting points for instituting systemic remedies at
both the organizational and pedagogical level. Because race can be an emotional
and personal topic for students and instructors, pedagogical experts on teaching
race have emphasized the development of critical thinking skills; the exploration
of other people’s lived experiences; and a supportive communicative climate in
the classroom. Though this might sound idealistic but unattainable, scholars in
the fields of education, law, and Internet technologies, who recognize that
schools have a critical role to play in tackling cyber racism, have already begun
groundbreaking work from which legislators and educators could take
inspiration.130

(i) Legal Literacy
The challenge lies in helping youth come to their own recognition of
ethical and legal boundaries when encountering negative forms of
online information, and fostering leadership among all stakeholders,
young and old, towards social responsibility and digital citizenship.
—Define the Line131

Curbing the proliferation on cyber racism requires tackling the problem at its
source. Finding ways to develop legal awareness among school-age children is a
necessary first step. The Canadian Bar Association defines legal literacy as the
ability to understand words used in a legal context, to draw conclusions from
them, and then to use those conclusions to take action.132 Legal literacy provides
an important educational imperative because it demonstrates that neither
Internet filters nor zero-tolerance policies imposed by schools are sustainable
solutions to addressing cyber racism. Instead, the focus is on granting youth
agency. Encouraging legal literacy programs in schools has the potential to
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empower youth by helping them to better understand the potential ramifications
of their actions online.
Research shows that education can play a strong role in promoting legal
literacy and dignity of human beings.133 Schools should be expected to teach
basic legal principles. An understanding of substantive legal principles should
include a critical consideration of notions about equality; freedom of expression;
freedom of religion and conscience; the right to life, liberty, and security; the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and reasonable
accommodation of differences to the point of undue hardship.134 According to
Dr. Shaheen Shariff, a researcher at McGill University who has spent the last ten
years encouraging digital citizenship, legal principles and doctrines can be critical
elements of creating a democratic school system and healthy learning
environment, ‘‘[h]ence the fact that many educators ignore its relevance, places
them in compromised positions when censorship controversies are brought to the
courts.”135
In Shariff’s latest book entitled Sexting and Cyberbullying: Defining the Line
for Digitally Empowered Kids, Shariff examines the line between online joking
and legal ramifications.136 Dr. Shariff does not demonize the use of the Internet
or social media but focuses instead on preventative legal and educational
responses to issues implicit in the world of online communication. Research
produced by Dr. Shariff and the Define the Line research team encourages the
development of digitally empowered generations. 137 The creation of digital
citizens is realized through the incorporation of legal literacy programs, which
seek comprehensive ways to address cyberbullying. In this context, legal literacy
is defined as an understanding of where the law defines the line between joking,
teasing, or harmless actions and criminal behaviours.138
What is needed is support to help youth define reasonable and realistic
boundaries of responsibility and accountability; and education that
raises awareness of the serious impact of cyberbullying and cyberlurking/voyeurism, with a view to providing an alternative online
information that is entertaining—but does not demean or dehumanize
others.139
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While young people may think little of the consequences attached to their
actions, they must be made aware that they can be serious. This discussion can
happen in the context of rights, privacy, and mutual respect. In an interview with
Philip Alpert, a US teen who was put on the sex offender registry after having
distributed nude images of his ex-girlfriend through email, he says:
I wasn’t thinking at all. Had I thought about it, I might have realized
this is probably illegal, but I certainly wouldn’t have known all the
ramifications of it. . .You might assume it was illegal, but you don’t
really know. Kids don’t go to a library and research this stuff.140

Though his case primarily serves to problematize the application of
traditional child pornography laws to minors, his statement nevertheless
demonstrates that in order to protect youth from using the Internet in a way
that may harm themselves or others, they must be given legal literacy tools. As
noted by the author who conducted the interview, the issue of Internet safety
‘‘merits a social response rather than criminal prosecution . . . Solutions to the
problems raised by sexting . . . should include education and the involvement of
community stakeholders.”141

(ii) Digital Media Literacy
Developing digital citizens among youth requires that they be given the
opportunity to enhance their online proficiency and creativity, rather than simply
being told ‘‘how not to use the Internet.” This is because a narrow focus on the
negative aspects of digital communications usage among youth ‘‘ignores the
potential benefits of digital media, and the possibility for youth to engage in
socially responsible digital behaviour.”142 Digital media lessons to enhance
online proficiency can be integrated into other lessons.
The first advocates for multiple literacies explain that the approach combines
traditional print literacy with critical media literacy to create lessons on to how to
access, navigate, create, and participate in digital media. 143 Daniels conceives
digital media literacy to involve lessons of tolerance and social justice, which can
offer ‘‘a depth of understanding about race, racism, and multiple, intersecting
forms of oppression and civil rights in the digital era.”144 Parents and school
administrators must also be aware of the legal risks of their online actions in
order to provide positive examples to younger people.
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CONCLUSION
Laws, standards, and organizational policies whose effects—which are often
subtle—are to reinforce the exclusion or marginalization of racialized minorities
must be scrutinized as part of sincere anti-racism efforts. 145 Indeed, progress can
stem from constitutional conflicts and courageous legal responses. Human rights
legislation can have a transformative impact if the focus is on systemic
barriers.146 Decisions discussed in this article demonstrate that the interaction
between various human rights frameworks can increase the possibility for
systemic problems to be identified and remedied. What makes cyber racism so
ripe for legal discussion is that it represents a social and technological
phenomenon that goes beyond what the law can aptly address. Overall, the
issue of online racism needs to be addressed through social and institutional
mechanisms, for there exists no one size fits all statute. Furthermore, various
stakeholders have a role to play in eliminating the prejudices that help sustain
systemic discrimination, and promoting human dignity for all.
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